Tenure-track contract helps self-selection by Popov, Sergey V.
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/103247/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Popov, Sergey V. 2015. Tenure-track contract helps self-selection. Economics Bulletin 35 (4) , pp.
2482-2486. file 
Publishers page: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/eb/default.aspx?top...
<http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/eb/default.aspx?topic=Abstract&PaperID=EB-15-00364>
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
Volume 35, Issue 4
Tenure-track contract helps self-selection
Sergey V. Popov Queen''s University Belfast
Abstract
Tenure-track contract is criticized for curbing the incentives to expend effort after obtaining tenured status. Yet themost productive faculties seem to work on a tenure contract, and schools which aim to employ the best faculty seemto prefer to offer tenure-track contracts to their new recruits. I argue that tenure-track contracts are by constructionmore attractive to more able freshly minted PhDs, and therefore the observed sorting is rationalizable.
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1. Introduction
Machlup (1964) describes four different types of tenure, starting from tenure by law and
ending with tenure by courtesy, kindness, timidity or inertia. Some schools do not offer
tenure contracts, but they act towards their faculty as if they had a tenure contract, and one
can easily name an example of an underperforming faculty member in a non-tenure school
who is certainly not getting fired. The question is, therefore: why do schools impose on
themselves the burden of a tenure contract instead of merely acting as if they did?
Tenure by contract, unlike tenure by kindness, requires having a tenure-track position.
The path from tenure-track to tenure is not the same as the path from the non-tenure-track1
to entrenchment because the evaluation of the tenure-track contract is independent of the
current job market situation. For instance, many more people take part in evaluating a
tenure candidate, from the top brass of the home university to reference writers from outside
the department, who try to establish whether the candidate satisfies the school’s standards.
The lecturer, however, can be replaced by a better-performing outsider; so the decision of
whether to keep the lecturer has a noisier threshold. In this paper, I show that a risk-
neutral freshly minted PhD of high ability, when choosing between a tenure-track contract
and a lecturer contract, effectively behaves as a risk-averse individual, and prefers the former;
whereas the PhD of low ability behaves as a risk-lover, and prefers the lecturer contract.
This explanation complements other economic arguments for tenure. For instance, Alchian
(1953) reasons that permanent employment might translate into lower salaries, lowering the
faculty costs for the university and for society. Carmichael (1988) argues that the non-
tenured faculty, not willing to nurture competition, will underreport the ability of talented
incomers. McPherson and Winston (1983) argues that the narrow specialization of profes-
sors in cases of free hiring and firing will require too much costly turnover compared to less
specialized industry. Brown (1997) reasons that tenure is natural to academic institutions
because academics are the residual claimants of the university’s product (see his paper for
a historical overview of development of the US education system).2 All these reasons take
the faculty body as fixed and given; my argument, however, is based on the change in the
ability distribution of the incoming faculty.
These economic reasons complement AAUP’s Statement of Principles of 1940, which out-
lined the tenure system to protect the faculty’s academic freedom (Ginsberg (2011) provides
some excellent popular reading in the history of academic freedom abuse), but Ceci et al.
(2006) empirically questions the efficiency of the tenure system in this regard. Neverthe-
less, Premeaux (2012) finds universal support for the tenure system in US business schools.3
Criticism of the tenure system is abundant: other things being equal, administrators would
like to have more rights to create more incentives for the professors. The contribution of this
1In the US, these are usually called adjunct professors or lecturers; in UK, they are called teaching fellows.
Hereafter, we will refer to these contracts as lecturers’ contracts.
2Cater et al. (2015) surveys more recent papers for the interested reader, and argues that tenure contracts
make sense if students value a faculty’s past accomplishments.
3Oster and Hamermesh (1998) finds that economists’ productivity declines with career after a peak around
the usual tenure decision time, but does not attribute this to tenure incentives. Jones et al. (2014) finds that
the peaking occurs for Nobel prize winners and inventors, too, which makes the tenure decision an unlikely
driver.
paper is to show that, in using the tenure-track contract, administrators create incentives for
the right job market candidates to manifest themselves by their choice of the right up-or-out
contract4.
2. The Problem of a Freshly Minted PhD
Consider a problem of a freshly graduated PhD (hereafter AP) who chooses between two
offers. AP has an innate ability θ, and after 6 years of employment, he will be able to
demonstrate a signal of his ability q = θ+ε, where ε is distributed with a pdf f(·), continuous
and positive on R, and a cdf F (·). AP chooses between offers from two schools and an outside
opportunity, which provides a lifetime utility u¯. At the moment of choice, AP knows his
θ, but not his ε. The time discount factor to compare the payoff today with a payoff in 6
years is δ. Let the utility of being a faculty member during the probation period be γ. AP
is risk-neutral.
School 1 offers a tenure-track contract. After 6 years, AP will be evaluated: if his signal
q is above qˆ, he will get promoted to a professorial position (the lifetime utility of which is
normalized to 1), and otherwise his only option is the outside opportunity u¯ < 1.
Therefore, the utility from choosing the offer from School 1 is
U1(θ) = γ + δ
pass tenure review︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− F (qˆ − θ))+F (qˆ − θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
fail tenure review
[δu¯] = γ + δ − δ[1− u¯]F (qˆ − θ).
School 2 offers a lecturer contract that does not have a tenure-track confirmation
rule. In 6 years, the school may encounter an alternative employee (from a different school,
for instance) whose signal of quality is q˜. If q < q˜, the school sacks the AP, and hires
another worker instead. The AP then will enjoy the outside opportunity u¯. If the alternative
employee is not as good (q ≥ q˜), the AP gets promoted to a professorial position (utility of
which is 1), which is not challenged by outsiders because of the entrenchment. The random
variable q2 is distributed on [q, q¯]. The utility from the offer of School 2 is therefore
U2(θ) = Eq˜

γ + δ
AP beats challenger︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− F (q˜ − θ))+F (q˜ − θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Challenger beats AP
[δu¯]

 = γ + δ − δ[1− u¯]Eq˜F (q˜ − θ).
I assume that all monetary payoffs in both schools are identical to be sure that all the
differences in the preferences of the AP are driven solely by the contract structure.
4These contracts are not specific to the Economics profession. Kahn and Huberman (1988) suggests that
this is a device for stimulating firm-specific investments. Waldman (1990) proposes a signalling model of
an up-or-out contract. I remain agnostic about the reasons why up-or-out contracts are used in academia,
and employ the common knowledge that most contracts in the Economics academic job market have the
up-or-out feature.
θ
qˆ
Ui(·) U1(θ)
U2(θ)
U1(θ) is concaveU1(θ) is convex
Note: the density in the picture is single-peaked, with peak at 0: f ′(0) = 0. This allows more
precise characterization to be made of the areas discussed in Proposition 1: for θ > 2qˆ − q,
U1(θ) > U2(θ), and the reverse holds for θ < 2qˆ − q¯.
Figure 1: The Utility of the AP
Proposition 1. When E[q˜] = qˆ, high θ APs prefer School 1, whereas low θ APs prefer
school 2.
Proof. Function f(x), to be a proper pdf, has to increase for small x and decrease for large
x to integrate to 1 while being positive. Because of this:
• When θ is high enough, function −F (qˆ − θ) is concave in the relevant region, and by
Jensen’s inequality, −F (qˆ − θ) = −F (Eq˜[q˜]− θ) > Eq˜[−F (q˜ − θ)].
• When θ is low enough, function −F (qˆ − θ) is convex in the relevant region, and by
Jensen’s inequality, −F (qˆ − θ) = −F (Eq˜[q˜]− θ) < Eq˜[−F (q˜ − θ)].
Picking a θ large (small) enough to be sure that the whole support of q˜, [q, q¯], is inside the
concave (convex) zone of −F (qˆ − θ) finishes the proof.
The intuition of this Proposition is straightforward. When the best APs know that their
threshold is fixed, it is easier for them to be sure that they will pass the threshold, while
less able APs know the chances of tenure are slim for them, and they choose the lecturer
contract hoping that no one more able will challenge their employment. The noisiness of
the threshold increases both Type I and Type II errors. Able APs suffer because of an
increased Type II error; less able authors benefit because of an increased Type I error. This
Proposition also supplies an intuition why it is extremely hard to move from being a lecturer
to a tenure-track job: if a person had agreed already to be a lecturer while clearly being able
to secure a tenure-track position in a similar school, they has already signalled their belief
in their own inferior ability.
Robustness More frequent challenges to the lecturer’s contract, as well as additional
challenges after 6 years of service, will increase the riskiness of that contract, making it
less attractive for able APs. The interim evaluations of the lecturer’s ability will be even
noisier: indeed, if an interim evaluation is less noisy, the administration can use this interim
evaluation signal instead of the signal in 6 years’ time. Were the threshold in School 1 higher
than the average threshold in School 2, the envelope theorem would predict that School 1
would become less attractive for all AP types; but since the marginal (dis)utility of higher
threshold is proportional to f(·), most- and least-able authors are least affected by that
change.
The payoff from the lecturer’s job being identical in all aspects, such as γ and u¯, to the
payoff from the tenure-track job is needed to make contrast more evident (in fact, in some
countries university administration has limited control over the salary of faculty members).
Obviously, if the job yields smaller payoff, it’s going to be less attractive, and lower demands
for tenure, other things being equal, will make the job more attractive. If, after failing tenure
review, the AP can still try for a post as a lecturer, the utility of being on a tenure-track job
is weakly higher; if the AP can use both offers sequentially, he is first going to use the one
with higher utility from the scenario of Proposition 1.
The assumption that the challengers’ abilities come from a bounded support goes against
the spirit of the proof of Proposition 1. Indeed, one would naturally assume that the AP
who makes a decision must have his ability θ ∈ [q, qˆ]. This makes it hard to posit θ high
enough so ensure that the whole interval of possible thresholds is in the concave portion of
the utility function. However, after grasping Proposition 1, one can immediately see that if
the distribution of challengers’ abilities comes from a mix of a bounded support distribution
(“the usual contenders”) and an unbounded support distribution (“the unusual contenders”),
the ordering of U1(θ) and U2(θ) has to remain the same if the share of the unbounded support
distribution is not too large. AP in question might as well be an unusual contender!
Policy Implications Banning tenure, á la Margaret Thatcher’s 1987 policy, will pre-
vent universities from offering tenure-track contracts, and therefore will incapacitate the
country’s university system to attract the brightest international APs without paying larger
salaries than foreign competing universities are paying. For universities, the choice between
advertising a tenure-track job and advertising a teaching job must be part and parcel of the
decision about the desired quality of applicants. For APs on the job market, a casual dec-
laration of one’s preference between otherwise identical contracts might have consequences
even without any irrational prejudices on the part of the employers, simply because this
preference is informative about the speaker’s ability.
3. Conclusion
One criticism of the tenure system is that it promotes mediocrity, by removing the adminis-
trators’ ability to fire underperforming professors. Here I argue that tenure-track contracts
are more attractive to more able APs, others being equal, thus improving the ability distri-
bution of the incoming faculty in schools which offer tenure contracts. This complements the
usual arguments for or against tenure, which mostly concentrate on the behavior of tenured
faculty.
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